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I argue for the unexceptionality of evidence about what rationality requires. Specifically, I 
argue that, as for other topics, one’s total evidence can sometimes support false beliefs about 
this. Despite being prima facie innocuous, a number of philosophers have recently denied 
this. Some have argued that the facts about what rationality requires are highly dependent 
on the agent’s situation, and change depending on what that situation is like (Bradley, 2019). 
Others have argued that a particular subset of normative truths, those concerning what 
epistemic rationality requires, have the special property of being ‘fixed points’ – it is 
impossible to have total evidence that supports false belief about them (Smithies, 2012; 
Titelbaum, 2015). Each of these kinds of exceptionality permit a solution to downstream 
theoretical problems that arise from the possibility of evidence supporting false belief about 
requirements of rationality. However, as I argue here, they incur heavy explanatory burdens 
that we should avoid.  
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A natural thought is that evidence about what rationality requires behaves in roughly the 
same way as evidence about other topics. If so, then one’s evidence can sometimes support 
false beliefs about what rationality requires. A number of philosophers have recently denied 
this. Some because they have thought that the facts about what rationality requires change 
depending on the agent’s evidential situation (Bradley, 2019; Kvanvig, 2014; Way & Whiting, 
2016). Others because they have thought that normative truths concerning what epistemic 
rationality requires have the special property of being ‘fixed points’, such that every evidential 
situation justifies true belief about them. (Smithies, 2012; Titelbaum, 2015). Here, I consider 
both kinds of defence of what I call the Impossibility Thesis. 
                                                          
1 I am grateful to various others for their help in thinking through these issues. In particular: Lisa Bastian, Jessica 
Brown, Al Casullo, Nilanjan Das, Phillip Ebert, Patrick Greenough, Nick Hughes, Jonathan Ichikawa, Maria 
Lasonen-Aarnio, Clayton Littlejohn, Anna-Sara Malmgren, Giacomo Melis, audiences at the St Andrews, Stirling, 
and Michigan, and two anonymous reviewers.  
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Impossibility Thesis: Evidential situations requiring false belief about what 
rationality requires are impossible. 
One reason to like the Impossibility Thesis is that it rules out an awkward evidential situation 
that threatens the consistency of our theories of epistemic rationality. Suppose that 
rationality requires you to believe P. Then, suppose that you have some evidence supporting 
the false belief that, in fact, you are required to not believe P. Are you required to believe P, 
or not? On the one hand, you seem to be required to not believe P, because this is what your 
evidence about what rationality requires supports. On the other hand, you seem to be 
required to believe P, since this is what the true requirements in fact require. You are in a 
bind – you appear to be required to both believe and not believe P. The Impossibility Thesis 
offers a way out of this problem – it rules out the situations in which this inconsistency arises. 
However, I argue here that it creates more problems than it solves. I argue that we should 
prefer the following Simple View of evidential support.   
Simple View: Evidential situations supporting false belief about what 
rationality requires are possible about all topics.  
Following others in this debate, I understand requirements of rationality as necessary conditions of 
having rational epistemic attitudes, without taking much of a stand on what these are2. However, I do 
assume that there are some necessary conditions of rationality, and that there is a fact of the matter 
about what these are. 
Section 1 outlines possible situations in which an evidential situation appears to support false 
belief about what rationality requires, and shows how the Simple View can explain it easily. 
Section 2 examines Perspectival defences of the Impossibility Thesis, according to which 
evidence about what rationality requires changes the facts about what rationality requires. 
Section 3 examines Objectivist defences of the Impossibility Thesis, on which evidential 
situations can never support false beliefs about what rationality requires. Section 4 outlines 
some reasons for optimism about dealing with the problem of inconsistent requirements 
without the Impossibility Thesis. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 For example, Titelbaum describes them as “constraints on […] reasoning arising from consistency requirements 
among an agent’s attitudes, evidence, and whatever else reasoning takes into account.” (2015: 254). 
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1. Misleading Evidence  
Evidence can support false belief about all kinds of subject matters. The Simple View says that 
what rationality requires is a subject matter like any other, and so something that evidence 
can support false belief about. Studying philosophy is a good way to get evidence for false 
belief about what rationality requires. Consider: 
Logic 101. It is a requirement of rationality to avoid contradictory belief (let 
us suppose). Suppose also that you are about to take your first introductory 
course in logic. Unfortunately, your instructor is an overzealous advocate of 
dialetheism, and believes that rationality sometimes requires contradictory 
belief, for example in response to instance of the Liar Paradox3. He well-
meaningly introduces you to all the best arguments for dialetheism, some 
paraconsistent logic, and some unconvincing challenges to dialetheism. By 
the end of the course, you believe, falsely, that rationality sometimes 
requires contradictory belief. 
A natural explanation of this situation is that your evidential situation supports a false belief 
about what rationality requires. For example, your instructor counts as an expert in this 
domain, which makes his testimony evidence. The philosophical arguments you study also 
give you evidence. You lack the capacity to refute any of this evidence. However, none of it 
changes the facts about what rationality requires – rationality still requires that you avoid 
contradictory belief.   
Similar cases are possible for any other putative requirement of rationality. Epistemologists 
are in the business of making arguments for and against various requirements of rationality: 
requirements to believe/not believe lottery propositions4, requirements to 
conciliate5/remain steadfast6 in the face of peer disagreement, requirements to be level 
coherent7, or not8. The extent of apparently reasonable disagreement about what rationality 
requires suggests that false belief about what rationality requires is common, and that it is 
often evidentially supported.  
                                                          
3 As developed in Priest (1979, 1985, 2005)).  
4 See (Hawthorne, 2003; Nelkin, 2000). 
5 See (Christensen, 2009). 
6 See (Elga, 2007). 
7 See (Broome, 1999, 2013; Brunero, 2012; Kolodny, 2005; Way & Whiting, 2016).  
8 See (Weatherson, 2019; Lasonen-Aarnio, 2014). 
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This simple explanation is ruled out by the Impossibility Thesis. As I argue in the following 
sections, neither of the ways of defending the Impossibility Thesis offers an adequate 
alternative explanation.  
 
2. Perspectivism 
Perspectivism holds that what rationality requires depends on the agent’s evidential 
situation. For example, Bradley (2019) avoids the problem of inconsistent requirements by 
arguing that evidence against a putative requirement changes what is required9. If your 
situation includes evidence that a rule does not apply, then that rule does not apply – the rule 
is defeated. On this view, the Impossibility Thesis is true because if one’s evidential situation 
indicates that rationality requires P, then rationality really does require P.  
Bradley focuses on epistemic rules such as ‘believe P if you have a perception that P’, and 
‘believe P if you have testimony that P’. He argues that evidence that one of these rules does 
not apply in a particular case defeats that rule – it no longer applies in that case. Instead, what 
each agent is required to believe in a situation is specified by a complicated and indefeasible 
‘Uber-rule’. However, an important shared feature of the rules that Bradley discusses is that 
they seem to gain respectability from the more fundamental epistemic rule ‘believe what the 
evidence supports’. If this is right, then it is not surprising that evidence against the reliability 
of one’s perceptions can defeat the rule. The rule only ever had instrumental force – it was a 
good way of complying with the fundamental rule to believe what the evidence supports. 
Receiving evidence that trusting perception is not a way to believe what the evidence 
supports does defeat the perceptual epistemic rule, but it is less clear that more fundamental 
rules can be defeated so easily. Rational requirements are more fundamental than 
instrumental rules like ‘believe P if you have a perception that P’10. 
There are two options for interpreting how Bradley’s position should respond to this point11. 
Either he must concede that there are some fixed points that one cannot have misleading 
                                                          
9 He characterises it as the view that epistemic rules are defeasible. See also (Kvanvig, 2003, 2014; Way & 
Whiting, 2016). 
10 The argument bears some resemblance to Weatherson’s view that we ought to adjust our beliefs in light of 
higher-order evidence only when that higher-order evidence gives us information about what the evidence 
actually supports ((Weatherson, 2019: 120, Ch. 8). 
11 Bradley acknowledges that his position is consistent with either, though the comments he makes suggests he 
prefers the second (2019: 17).  
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evidence about, namely the more fundamental requirements of rationality, whatever those 
are12. This would convert the view from Perspectivist view to an Objectivist view. Or, he could 
say that the more fundamental requirements of rationality are also defeasible – that is, 
affected by the agent’s evidence. On this interpretation, the only true requirement is a long 
and complicated ‘Uber-rule’ specifying very precisely what is required of each agent in each 
situation.  
If this is the position, then it is not as good an explanation as the Simple View of cases such as 
Logic 101. There are three key reasons for this. First, it amounts to an error theory about the 
more familiar rational requirements – requirements such as the Law of Non-Contradiction 
were never universally applicable requirements applying to all rational agents, as we might 
have thought they were. The story this view tells about Logic 101 is that this is not a case in 
which you are misled by evidence for a false view, but rather it is a case in which, in fact, you 
are required to believe a contradiction. On this view, requirements of rationality are flimsier 
than we might have thought. They are also less as good guides as we might have hoped. 
Bradley accepts this (2019: 14), but it is nevertheless a cost that must be justified by robust 
theoretical gains13.  
 
Second, this view is faces pressure to restrict what can count as rationally required for an 
agent in such a way that avoids collapsing into triviality, where any attitude at all being 
potentially rationally required. However, it is unclear whether this can be done while 
maintaining commitment to the view that one’s evidential situation determines what 
rationality requires. This is particularly true if one shares Bradley’s view that something’s 
seeming to be evidence is sufficient for it to be evidence – for example, he expresses 
incredulity at the view that “what seems like evidence doesn’t even count as evidence” (2019: 
6). However, what our evidence is and what our evidence seems to be are very different 
                                                          
12 This view would resemble Quine’s holism, on which everything is rationally revisable except for the 
fundamental truths of logic (Quine, 1970, 1960).  
13 For one thing, it makes mysterious why we should comply with rational requirements at all, since a natural 
answer is that rationality’s function is to guide agents towards epistemically better beliefs (see Gibbons (2013: 
24), Rinard (2018: 259), Wedgwood (2017: 182)).  
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matters. Something may appear to be evidence from one’s perspective, even if it is not14,15. 
However, as soon as one begins to introduce restrictions on which attitudes could be 
rationally required, one risks compromising the view’s core commitments, and ruling out 
possible evidential situations. This is an Objectivist, not a Perspectivist strategy.  
Third, the view that requirements are defeasible introduces these awkward theoretical 
features unnecessarily. Bradley is right to point out that there is something positively 
evaluable about agents who have evidence that a rule does not apply, and do not follow that 
rule. However, it does not follow from this that the rule ceases to apply to the agent in that 
case. Agents can break rules and be excused, and or even justified. Excuse and justification 
are positive evaluations in the sense that they remove blame that would have been deserved 
had the rule been broken without excuse or justification16. However, they do not imply that 
the rule ceases to apply. So, we can explain the case without postulating requirements of 
rationality that fluctuate in response to details of the agent’s situation. This offers another 
way to describe the situation of the students of Logic 101: their misleading evidence gives 
them an excuse for disobeying the requirements of rationality, but it does not make it rational 
for them to disobey the requirements17. The following section examines Objectivist defences 
of the Impossibility Thesis.  
 
3. Objectivism 
Objectivism defends the Impossibility Thesis by making a claim about which evidential 
situations are possible. Specifically, it rules out the possibility of situations in which the total 
evidence supports false belief about what rationality requires.  
One way that some philosophers have attempted to rule out these situations is by appeal to 
the agent’s already having strong evidence supporting the truth about what rationality 
requires. For example, Titelbaum claims that: [E]very agent possesses a priori, propositional 
                                                          
14 For defenders of this view, see (Alvarez, 2010; Dancy, 2000; Parfit, 2011; Raz, 1975; Skorupski, 2010). Some 
accept this view while demanding an additional epistemic condition, for example Dancy’s claim that for a fact to 
provide one with a reason, it must pass through an ‘epistemic filter’. That is, it must be knowable (see Dancy 
2000: 57-59). 
15 Even if reasons are not facts, there will be a fact of the matter about which of the agent’s mental items count 
as reasons. 
16 See (Austin, 1961). This also applies to the legal concept of justification and excuse (see (Duff, 2007)).  
17 For further discussion of excusable norm violation in epistemology see (Boult, 2019; Hawthorne & Srinivasan, 
2013; Kelp, 2016; Littlejohn, forthcoming; Sutton, 2007; Williamson, forthcoming).  
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justification for true beliefs about the requirements of rationality in her current situation 
(2015: 276), and Smithies that “one always has a special kind of epistemic access to facts 
about which propositions one has justification to believe” (2012: 273). Call this claim Assets.  
Assets: All agents, in all possible situations, have evidence that 
overwhelmingly supports the truth about what rationality requires. 
Smithies and Titelbaum take Assets to support the Impossibility Thesis, because they take 
these claims about which evidential situations are possible to rule out situations in which the 
agent has total evidence that supports a false belief about what rationality requires.  
One possible motivation for thinking that Assets is true is that it is a consequence of Bayesian 
commitments to logical omniscience. Logical omniscience says that for all agents in all 
situations, their evidence – whatever it is – supports all logical truths to credence 1. Some 
have thought that our a priori evidence is identical to that of the Bayesian ideally rational 
agent (Christensen (2004: 162), Smithies (2012: 8)). However, logical omniscience is often, if 
not usually, taken to be a bug rather than a feature of Bayesian epistemology18. Commitment 
to logical omniscience introduces the significant challenge of working out how to make 
intelligible the claim that non-ideal agents have this evidence supporting credence 1 in all 
logical truths, even when this is opaque to them19. Not only this, but we would need a good 
story about how logical truths are related to requirements of rationality20.  
Some have thought that Assets is implied by the unrestrictedness of a priori reasoning. As 
Titelbaum goes on to explain, “[a]n agent can reflect on her situation and come to recognize 
facts about what that situation rationally requires. Not only does this reflection provide her 
with justification to believe those facts; that justification is ultimately empirically 
indefeasible.” (2015: 276).  One might think that because the question of what rationality 
requires is a priori, so long as agents have the ability to reflect, then they can easily acquire 
evidence for the truth about what rationality requires. While there are physical limitations 
                                                          
18 In fact, on some views it is neither. Some attempts to weaken Bayesianism’s commitment to logical 
omniscience include (Easwaran, 2016; Gaifman, 2004; Garber, 1983; Hacking, 1967; Williams, 2018).   
19 One approach is to emphasise a distinction between formal systems associated with rationality and good 
epistemic practices (Cohen (1981); Harman (1986); Russell (2017)), another, different, approach is offered by 
Stalnaker (1991). Some have nevertheless attempted the project of defending this unpopular logical 
omniscience requirement (see Smithies (2015), Wedgwood (2017)). 
20 Articulating this is an unresolved issue (see Besson (2010), Russell (2017), Harman (1986)). Often, it takes the 
form of a search for the correct ‘bridge principles’ between truths of logic and normative epistemic principles. 
Macfarlane (2004) offers 36 different ones to choose from, each with their own theoretical costs and benefits. 
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on, for example, where I can transport my body to gather empirical evidence, there are no 
such limitations on what I can think about21. However, it is not clear that the sense in which 
agents in some situations ‘could’ come to acquire evidence for normative truths about 
rationality is sufficient to establish Assets. For example, consider agents who have never 
considered the matter, who have apparent defeaters or rebutters that count against the 
normative truths, or who lack the intellectual competence to do the necessary reasoning. If 
there is a sense in which these could acquire evidence for the truth, it is not clear that this is 
not a sense of ‘could’ that affects what they are now justified in believing.  
However, even if true, Assets cannot establish the Impossibility Thesis alone. Assets says that 
we always have evidence that overwhelmingly supports the truth about what rationality 
requires. To get from this to the Impossibility Thesis it must also be true that this evidence is 
not defeasible by other features of the agent’s situation, and that this evidence plays a 
meaningful role in determining what the agent ought to believe. In other words, Assets needs 
help from the following two claims: 
Indefeasibility22: All agents, in all situations have evidence for the truth 
about what rationality requires that is indefeasible. 
Sufficiency: All agents, in all situations, have evidence for the truth about 
what rationality requires that is sufficient to rule out the possibility that the 
agent’s evidential situation requires false beliefs about what rationality 
requires. 
If all three of these were true then the Impossibility Thesis would be true, because our total 
evidence would always require believing the truth about what rationality requires. However, 
all three claims are contentious. Even worse, this strategy rules out the simple explanation of 
cases of apparent misleading evidence about what rationality requires.  
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Wedgwood (2017), for example, motivates a commitment to Assets in this way. Although he concedes that 
our access to these assets is restricted in such a way that respects human limitations, even with this restriction 
this implies that we have access to significantly more a priori evidence than empirical evidence. 
22 Indefeasibility about a priori justification is defended by Field ((2000); Ichikawa & Jarvis (2013); Kitcher (1980); 
Smithies (2015); Titelbaum (2015). In so far as the truths about what rationality requires are a priori, these views 
would also be committed to indefeasibility about justification for truths about what rationality requires.  
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3.1 Indefeasibility 
To get from the Assets claim to the Impossibility Thesis, our putative evidence for the truth 
about what rationality requires would need to be indefeasible. However, cases such as Logic 
101 look like cases in which if there were any Assets, they are defeated. So, if we do have 
evidence that justifies true beliefs about what rationality requires, it is not clear that this 
justification is indefeasible23.  
For example, suppose, as some have thought, that we have default justification for basic laws 
of logic such as the Law of Non-Contradiction24. In some sense, they are such that they are 
impossible to rationally doubt. If this is right, then one might be tempted to think that in Logic 
101 your evidence could not really support believing that rationality sometimes requires 
contradictory belief – you must be confused. However, you are a beginner. Although you may 
start out with default justification for the truth about what rationality requires, it is much less 
clear that this justification remains undefeated in the face of all the testimonial and 
argumentative evidence you get against it. It is not at all clear that your default justification 
can ensure that your evidential situation decisively supports believing the truth about what 
rationality requires. It may do this in ordinary circumstances, but in ordinary circumstances 
you are not given arguments against it. As a beginner, you have nothing to back it up with. 
This means that when you begin to acquire more and more evidence in favour of the false 
beliefs about what rationality requires, your evidence begins to tilt in their direction.  
According to standard accounts of defeat, justification can be defeated by both undermining 
and rebutting evidence, regardless of the strength of the justification (Brown, 2018; J. L. 
Pollock, 1986). So, not only are you justified in believing the false view about what rationality 
requires, but this justification also defeats any other justification you could have been 
presumed to have for the truth about what rationality requires25. If this standard view is right, 
then it cannot be true that our putative justification for the truth about what rationality 
requires is indefeasible 
Indefeasibility does not simply fall out of the a priority of the Assets, as some have thought. 
At least, not without further work. Justification for beliefs about what rationality requires is 
                                                          
23 For example, Wright explicitly denies this (Wright, 2004b, 2004a, 2014).  
24 See (Boghossian, 2003; Dummett, 1974; Ichikawa & Jarvis, 2013; Lewis, 2004a; Peregrin, 2014; Wright, 2004a). 
25 This is consistent with views that take us to have defeasible entitlement to believe the truth about what 
rationality requires (see Wright (2004a; 2004b; 2014)).  
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sometimes thought to be indefeasible in virtue of being a priori. A priori justification is, by 
definition, justified independent of experience. Some have taken this to imply that any 
misleading evidence one could acquire for a priori claims must be, in some sense, experiential. 
For example, Smithies makes the claim that “a priori justification for beliefs about logic has 
its source in logical facts, rather than psychological facts about experience, reasoning, or 
understanding.” (2015: 2270). Since misleading evidence about logic cannot be a ‘logical fact’, 
its source must, on this view, be a ‘psychological fact about experience, reasoning, or 
understanding’26. If this were true, it would permit the following argument for the 
Indefeasibility claim: 
1. If P is justified a priori, then it is justified independent of any experience. 
2. If justification is independent of experience, then it cannot be defeated 
by experience. 
3. The misleading evidence in the cases is derived from experience. 
4. So, misleading evidence cannot defeat our propositional justification for 
the truth about what rationality requires (Indefeasibility). 
However, both Premises 2 and 3 are contentious. While you may have been justified in 
believing that rationality prohibits contradictions before you took Logic 10127, it is implausible 
that you are still justified in believing this after you have had heard the professor’s testimony. 
The fact that hearing the testimony is an experience is irrelevant to whether it is defeated28.  
For Premise 3 to be true, we need to assume a contentious understanding of `experience’, on 
which thinking through philosophical arguments is a (non-a priori) experience. On this view, 
propositions rather than processes are a priori. Episodes of thinking that stray from logical 
and philosophical truth are not a priori, but rather experiential29. There are two problems 
with assuming this contentious understanding of experience. Firstly, drawing a line between 
the a priori and the a posteriori is notoriously difficult. A prima facie plausible alternative view 
says that processes can be a priori, so that any evidence one acquires through a priori 
reasoning is itself a priori, and beliefs supported by that a priori evidence can be justified a 
                                                          
26 This view dates back to Frege (see particularly his essay, “Logic” (1897). Ichikawa and Jarvis (2013) defend a 
more general version of this view for all a priori truths.    
27 See Wright (2004b, 2014) on defeasible entitlements, as well as Bonjour on a priori justification (1998). 
28 Defenders of Indefeasibility typically explain away apparent cases of defeat such as this by appeal to a 
distinction between defeat and some weaker defeat-like status. The previous section argued that we should 
resist this strategy.  
29 This view is held by, for example, H. Field (2000); Ichikawa and Jarvis (2013); Kitcher (1980); Smithies (2015)).  
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priori30. So, defending Indefeasibility by citing that the justification is a priori would mean 
arguing for one way of drawing the a priori/a posteriori distinction.  
Not only this, but the view of the distinction that gives us Indefeasibility means taking a 
disjunctive view of abstract thinking – particular instances of abstract thinking will have very 
different epistemic statuses depending on their truth value. When abstract reasoning results 
in truth, one is a priori justified. When it goes wrong, the reasoning was not a priori at all, 
merely empirical or experiential. Sturgeon argues against disjunctivism about visual 
experience. He points out that veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences have various 
features in common, and we should want a theory that can explain these common features. 
However, disjunctivism precludes an explanation of these common features – it maintains 
that they are distinct in nature. I am inclined to agree with Sturgeon that a view that can 
explain common features is preferable, ceteris parabis, to a view that cannot (1998: 182).  
However, these points may turn out to be irrelevant. Theories of what rationality requires 
may not, in fact, be justified a priori. Anti-exceptionalist accounts of logic deny that logical 
theories are not justified a priori31. Instead, they are justified abductively. If this is right, then 
agents do not need a priori justification to be justified in their beliefs about logic. If this is true 
of logic, then it may well also be true for theories of what rationality requires32.  
More importantly, Indefeasibility leaves us without a good explanation for cases in which our 
putative Assets appear to be defeated. Some have attempted to explain cases of apparent 
defeat using a distinction between defeat and some weaker defeat-like status. They have 
argued that although our assets cannot be defeated, they can be ‘disabled’ (Smithies, 2015), 
or the agent can be `rationally compromised’ (Ichikawa & Jarvis, 2013). Such views say that 
when S’s justification for P is disabled, S is unable to use that justification in reasoning, and 
unable to justified belief that P on the basis of that justification. Nevertheless, S’s justification 
for P is not defeated. Unfortunately, this strategy permits only implausible explanations of 
the target cases33.  
                                                          
30 For example, see Casullo (1988); Jeshion (2000); Summerfield (1991).   
31 See (Hjortland, 2017; Lewis, 2004b; Maddy, 2002; Priest, 2016; Quine, 1951; Russell, 2015, 2014; Williamson, 
2007, 2013a, 2013b; Williamson & Armour-Garb, 2017).  
32 Even if anti-exceptionalist accounts of logic turn out to be incorrect in claiming that logic theories can be 
justified abductively, it may still be that abductive arguments are good enough evidence for non-experts. 
33 It is worth noting that an appeal to ‘disabling’ is not obviously dialectically helpful in an argument from Assets 
to the Impossibility Thesis. Disabling offers a way to make possible rational false belief about what rationality 
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Views that make use of disabling typically recognise only two ways that a priori propositional 
justification can be disabled. Either the agent makes an error due to cognitive incapacity akin 
to Chomskian ‘performance limitations’, or the agent has empirical evidence that she 
currently lacks the cognitive capacity to reason successfully. Limitation in cognitive processing 
capacity is an example of genuine cognitive incapacity. Some logical truths are too 
complicated to be deduced by ordinary human agents, even though they are entailed by their 
evidence, and propositions they already believe34. Cognitive biases are another example. They 
can cause performance error in reasoning by distracting agents from the facts they know to 
be true or would assert on reflection. Typical errors such as the conjunction fallacy are often 
like this. Distracted by irrelevant information, many people who should know better will claim 
that a conjunction is more likely than one of its conjuncts alone35. Disabling allows the agent to retain 
her propositional justification, even while it is disabled by cognitive performance limitations 
that prevent her at that moment from drawing the correct conclusion.  
However, this cannot offer explain cases like Logic 101. Here, your evidential situation 
supports the false belief about rationality because you are exercising your cognitive faculties 
well. Had you exercised them less well, you may not have followed the arguments, and so 
likely would have avoided acquiring evidence for the false belief about rationality. A possible 
line of response to this is that in Logic 101 your faculties are limited in one sense – your 
capacities for abstract philosophical reasoning are those of a beginner. Not only this, but you 
are being taught incorrect rules about how to reason rationally. There are, perhaps, many 
other good things to say about your reasoning capacities, but they are limited in some 
important respects. However, this response does not easily transfer to cases involving non-
logical requirements of rationality, such as requirements to conciliate (or not) in response to 
peer disagreement. When the false beliefs are about these, it is much less plausible that the 
mere fact that they endorse a false view compromises their general capacities for reasoning. 
If it did, this would overgeneralize. The point would also apply to experienced philosophers 
                                                          
requires. If Assets can be disabled, this offers a sense in which it could be rational to believe falsely about what 
rationality requires – without those Assets being defeated. However, those who defend the Impossibility Thesis 
typically do so as a way of denying the possibility of rational false belief about what rationality requires.  
34 Assuming a Bayesian framework, according to which all logical truths are entailed by any evidence set.  
35 For discussion, see Kahneman (2011); Kahneman et al. (1982); Tversky & Kahneman (1993). 
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who hold false views about what rationality requires, but no plausible standard would say 
that their reasoning capacities are limited36.  
One might reply that ideal agents would nevertheless have no false beliefs about what 
rationality requires. However, using the ideal to define what counts as a cognitive limitation 
risks generating a theory that is irrefutable. If every false belief about what rationality requires 
were an instance of limited capacity in which the agent really had (disabled) propositional 
justification for the truth, then the claim that an agent has propositional justification for P is 
would be irrefutable, and ultimately trivial.  
Nor can evidence of cognitive incapacity explain the cases. This is the remaining option on 
offer for how Assets could be disabled, as in the following example:  
Coffee. Suppose that I work out my proof of T after having coffee with my 
friend Jocko. Palms sweaty with the excitement of logical progress, I check 
my work several times, and decide that the proof is good. But then a trusted 
colleague walks in and tells me that Jocko has been surreptitiously slipping 
a reason-distorting drug into people’s coffee--a drug whose effects include 
a strong propensity to reasoning errors in 99% of those who have been 
dosed (1% of the population happen to be immune). He tells me that those 
who have been impaired do not notice any difficulties with their own 
cognition--they just make mistakes; indeed, the only change most of them 
notice is unusually sweaty palms. (Christensen 2007: 3). 
According to disabling views, evidence that my cognitive abilities are impaired prevents me 
making the logical inferences licensed by my propositional justification. It does this without 
affecting my propositional justification. Were this justification not disabled, I could use it to 
draw the correct inferences.  
There are important differences between Coffee and Logic 101. In Coffee, I receive empirical 
evidence about my logical reasoning capacities are impaired. Responding appropriately to this 
means giving appropriate (i.e. significantly less, or no) weight to evidence gathered using 
those capacities. Dealing properly with the evidence gathered from my capacities prevents 
me from forming justified beliefs based on my propositional justification for the logical facts. 
This is true for any other piece of logical reasoning I might undertake while I have evidence 
                                                          
36 For example, this would mean that Frege’s mistake about Basic Law V implies a limitation in his reasoning 
capacities.  
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that I am under the influence of the drug. In contrast, in Logic 101, your evidence directly 
concerns what rationality requires. Responding appropriately to it means weighing it in your 
deliberation about the truth of what rationality requires, against other evidence that you have 
about this topic. This is quite different, and suggests that Logic 101 is not a case of disabling 
via evidence of cognitive capacity.  
So, Logic 101 does not seem to be a case of disabling. However, we might think there is 
another explanation of it available to Objectivists, namely that your evidence does not 
support the false belief about what rationality requires because the very process of weighing 
up what your evidence supports relies upon classical reasoning principles, and by extension 
the Law of Non-Contradiction. One might worry that this dependence undermines the 
evidence that you seem to have for the false belief that rationality sometimes requires 
contradictory belief37. If this evidence really depends implicitly on classical logic38, including 
the Law of Non-Contradiction, one might think that this just provides more evidence for the 
Law of Non-Contradiction and against the false view that rationality sometimes requires 
contradictory belief.   
It is worth pointing out that this explanation, even if correct, would only rule out cases of 
misleading evidence about requirements of rationality that are sufficiently close to principles 
of logic. This will not work for requirements to conciliate in response to peer disagreement, 
or avoid believing lottery propositions. There is also some distance between the claim that 
one’s evidence supports or relies upon some logical principle, and the claim that it supports 
or relies a requirement of rationality based on that logical principle. We cannot assume a 
straightforward relationship between the truths of logic and truths about what rationality 
requires. For example, while (P & (P → Q)) → Q) is a logical truth, it is not a demand of 
rationality that if one believes P, and believes that (if P, then Q), then one also believes Q. 
Furthermore, even if there were a straightforward relationship between these, it is not clear 
that this would tip the evidential scales in favour of believing the true rational requirements, 
because it is not clear that the logical or rational principles we depend upon to acquire 
evidence themselves count as part of our evidence. This is uncontroversial in other domains 
– compare our beliefs about the physics of middle sized objects. I believe that if I drop my 
coffee mug it will fall to the ground. My evidence for this consists in past observations of 
                                                          
37 See (Woods, 2019a, 2019b) for an articulation of this worry.  
38 Whether it does is complicated, for discussion see (Hjortland, 2017; Woods, 2019a). 
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dropping mugs, and some elementary and incomplete understanding of gravitational laws.  
However, its truth is underpinned by various more complicated principles of physics that I 
have never considered, and would not understand if I did. These more complicated principles 
of physics do not form part of my evidence, but we might think that my reasoning about the 
physics of middle sized objects implicates them in an analogous way that your reasoning in 
Logic 101 implicates principles of classical logic. However, my evidence about whether mugs 
will fall does not support the complicated principles of physics, and I do not have evidence 
that supports believing these principles – at least not unless I learn much more about physics. 
The situation in Logic 101 is similar. So, even if it is true that ordinary reasoning about 
evidence is underpinned by principles of classical logic, these principles are not part of your 
evidence in Logic 101, at least in the absence of further arguments, evidence, and 
understanding of logic. This is true even assuming that you exhibit tendencies to avoid 
contradictory belief. Once you have fully absorbed the arguments you study for dialetheism, 
you have evidence that this tendency is only a tendency, and not supported by any 
requirement of rationality.    
So, Indefeasibility does not seem to be true. Moreover, the explanations of cases like Logic 
101 that are compatible with Assets are inadequate. We should thus prefer the Simple View’s 
account. However, even if we did not prefer the Simple View, there is a further problem with 
Assets – it needs Sufficiency. As the next subsection argues, Sufficiency is false.  
 
3.2 Sufficiency 
In addition to Indefeasibility, defending the Impossibility Thesis via Assets requires  
Sufficiency. 
Sufficiency: All agents, in all situations, have evidence for the truth about 
what rationality requires that is sufficient to rule out the possibility that the 
agent’s evidential situation requires false beliefs about what rationality 
requires. 
Sufficiency is importantly distinct from Indefeasibility. Indefeasibility is a claim about the 
strength of evidence. It says that the evidence postulated by Assets is maximally strong, such 
that it cannot be defeated. Sufficiency is a claim about how evidence, whatever its strength, 
can be used in deliberation. It says that the evidence postulated by Assets rules out other 
beliefs. The claims may appear similar because when indefeasible evidence for P does bear 
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on what S ought to believe, it will, in fact, typically rule out beliefs that not-P. However, 
indefeasibility does not by itself imply the ability to rule out the possibility that what  capacity 
to that the evidence bears on what S ought to believe is a claim strictly independent of 
Indefeasibility. Without sufficiency, even if it were true that all agents have evidence 
supporting the truth about what rationality requires, and that this was indefeasible, further 
argument would be required to establish how and why our having this evidence rules out the 
possibility of one’s total evidence supporting false beliefs about rationality, as the 
Impossibility Thesis claims.  
For evidence to be able to rule out the possibility of one’s situation requiring false belief about 
what rationality requires, it would need to play a role in determining what the agent ought to 
believe. However, it does not seem that it does.  
The problem is that the justification that the Assets provide is propositional, but not 
necessarily doxastic. Assets says that justification for the requirements of rationality is 
available to all rational agents in all situations, but this implies only that were they to reflect 
properly, then they would be rational to believe the truth about what rationality requires. a 
point on which Objectivist theories that postulate Assets agree. Here is Titelbaum again: 
How is the justificatory map arranged such that one is never all-things-
considered justified in both an attitude A and the belief that A is rationally 
forbidden in one’s current situation? The most obvious answer is that every 
agent possesses a priori, propositional justification for true beliefs about the 
requirements of rationality in her current situation.48 An agent can reflect 
on her situation and come to recognize facts about what that situation 
rationally requires. Not only can this reflection justify her in believing those 
facts; the resulting justification is also empirically indefeasible (2015: 276). 
Smithies qualifies Assets as follows: 
[It] is not a doxastic thesis about which of one’s beliefs are justified, but is 
rather an epistemic thesis about which propositions one has justification to 
believe. Justified belief requires not only having justification to believe a 
proposition, but also using it in believing that proposition on the basis of 
one’s justification to believe it. By contrast, having justification to believe a 
proposition does not require using it in forming a justified belief. As we shall 
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see, this distinction between epistemic and doxastic versions of the 
accessibility thesis is crucial for avoiding the problems of over-
intellectualization and vicious regress (2012: 276) 
Restricting Assets to a claim about propositional justification can seem to remove some of the 
pressure to accommodate or explain cases like Logic 101. The idea is that in such cases the 
agent is propositionally justified in the truth in spite of their misleading evidential situation. 
This can then be used to deny the claim that agents in such cases would be rational to believe 
falsely about rationality, and so avoid the problem of inconsistent requirements. However, 
this claim is silent on what agents are doxastically justified in believing, and this silence 
threatens the legitimacy of the restriction.  
There are three options for what you are doxastically justified in believing in Logic 101. 
Perhaps the most natural option is that you are doxastically justified in believing falsely about 
what rationality requires. This is, after all, what your evidence appears to support. However, 
if this is right then it is less plausible that you are propositionally justified in believing the truth 
about what rationality requires. Traditionally, P is propositionally justified for S if and only if 
S has justifiers (reasons or evidence) J sufficient to justify P39. Standardly, S is doxastically 
justified in believing P when the following three conditions hold: 
a) P is propositionally justified for S. 
b) S believes P. 
c) S believes P on the basis of her propositional justification. 
On this view, doxastic justification implies propositional justification. So, if you are 
doxastically justified in believing some false claim about what rationality requires, P, and you 
are propositionally justified in believing the true claim about rationality, not-P, then it is not 
true that the evidence postulated in Assets rules out evidential situations that require false 
beliefs about what rationality requires.  
This seems to be the situation in Logic 101. The proposition that rationality sometimes 
requires contradictory belief is supported by justifiers that you have - the evidence you 
acquire by taking Logic 101, albeit not to a maximal degree. So, in Logic 101, you meet all of 
(a) – (c). You believe it, you believe it on the basis of justifiers, and your justifiers support the 
                                                          
39 Turri identifies this as the ‘Orthodox view’  (2010: 314). Proponents of it include: Kvanvig (2003: §B1); Pollock 
(1986: 36-7); Swain (1979: 25)).  
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truth of the claim. So, given the `orthodox view’ of the relationship between doxastic and 
propositional justification, you are both doxastically and propositionally justified in the false 
belief about what rationality requires. On this first option, Sufficiency is false.  
The other options are compatible with Sufficiency, but they are implausible. A second option 
is that you are doxastically justified in believing the truth about what rationality requires. This 
cannot be right, because even assuming you have propositional justification for the truth, in 
this situation you have apparent defeaters for the true propositions, meaning that you lack a 
sound deliberative route from that justification to justified beliefs based on that justification.  
A third option is that you are doxastically justified in suspending judgment on the matter of 
what rationality requires. This is also implausible. Suspension would be appropriate if you 
have roughly equal amounts of evidence on either side – but this is not what you have. You 
have apparently very strong evidence for a false belief about what is required, and you have 
propositional justification that you are unable to make use of in your deliberation.  
A final option, perhaps, is that you cannot be doxastically justified in believing anything in the 
neighbourhood of what rationality requires. However, this is a restatement of the 
Impossibility Thesis. The only plausible option seems to be the first one, but if this is right then 
Sufficiency is false.  
Even worse, regardless of which option is correct, the propositional justification that Assets 
says we have plays very little role in determining what the agents should believe, given their 
situation. This suggests that Sufficiency is false – Assets cannot rule out evidential situations 
that require false beliefs in what rationality requires. We can illustrate the inertia of Assets by 
comparing agents in good and bad epistemic situations, but who, according to Assets, have 
the same propositional justification. Consider a student who takes Logic 101, and receives 
misleading evidence. Call her Anita. She studies well, follows the arguments where they lead, 
and acquires the false belief that rationality requires contradictory belief. Bertha is luckier – 
she takes a different class that teaches the true theory of what rationality requires. She also 
studies well, and follows the arguments where they lead, acquiring true beliefs about what 
rationality requires.  
Assets says that they both have the same propositional justification regarding what rationality 
requires. If this is true, it does not seem to make much of a difference between to their 
epistemic situations. This propositional justification, in so far as they have it, is epistemically 
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inert. This inertia prevents it from playing the role it would need to play in their deliberation 
if it was to rule out evidential situations supporting false belief about what rationality 
requires.  
Anita’s alleged propositional justification for the truth about what rationality requires is of no 
help to her deliberation – she lacks a viable deliberative route to doxastically justified belief 
in this true view. To reason her way out of her situation and towards the truth, Anita would 
need to rationally dismiss the misleading evidence for the false view. It is not reasonable to 
expect her to do this. Anita’s indefeasible propositional justification plays no role in 
determining what she should believe, given her evidence. Nor is it of any help to Bertha.  
Bertha studies the true theory of what rationality requires. Assets says that Bertha also has 
indefeasible propositional justification for the truth about what rationality requires. She also 
believes the truth about what rationality requires. However, it is unlikely that her belief is 
based on the evidence that Assets postulates. This evidence, we are told, supports the truth 
about what rationality requires to a maximal degree, in a way that is immune from the 
arguments of dialetheists. It is not clear that this would be comprehensible by a beginner. So, 
even though Gertrude believes what is supported by her propositional justification, it is not 
clear that she does so on the basis of them. So, these Assets would seem to be inert even in 
the good cases – even here they are irrelevant to what the agent ought to believe given her 
evidential situation40. Without something that connects us epistemically to our allegedly vast 
store of propositional justification, the evidence that Assets postulates can play no epistemic 
role in either good or bad cases – it is epistemically inert. This makes it insufficient to rule out 
the possibility of total evidence supporting false belief about what rationality requires. 
 
4. Theoretical Upshots  
Rejecting the Impossibility Thesis means incurring the burden of tackling head on the problem 
of inconsistent requirements of rationality. In this section I briefly mention three avenues for 
resolving the inconsistency without resorting to the Impossibility Thesis.  
                                                          
40 Consider also that most views that accept Assets take it to include not just what rationality requires, but also 
many other a priori truths of logic – both the very simple and the very complicated. However, threre is a clear 
difference between our epistemic situation with respect to the simpler and the more complicated logical truths, 
but the distinction cannot be made by appeal to the propositional justification that Assets gives us. This suggests 
that this justification is inert – it makes no difference to what we ought to believe. 
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One option is to simply accept the inconsistency as an epistemic dilemma41. Another is to 
make distinctions. For example, we might think that the apparent inconsistency arises from a 
failure to disambiguate two distinct sources of requirements, perhaps requirements of 
subjective and an objective rationality42.  Disambiguating these, we can understand agents in 
Logic 101 as objectively required to avoid believing contradictions, while also subjectively 
required to believe some contradictions. We might further flesh this out by arguing that 
‘rationality requires’ is context-dependent, such that its usage requires reference to a context 
in order to be meaningful (Björnsson & Finlay 2010; Pittard & Worsnip 2017; Worsnip, 
forthcoming)43. This avoids the inconsistency because no single sense of rationality issues 
inconsistent requirements.  
Alternatively, we might see the possibility of situations such as Logic 101 as support for 
denying that rationality requires enkratic coherence (see (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014, 2020; 
Weatherson 2019)). On this view, you would be required to follow your evidence in believing 
that rationality sometimes requires contradictory belief, but also required to avoid 
contradictory belief. This puts you in a tricky position, but it has the advantage of not 
threatening the consistency of our theories of epistemic rationality. None of these, perhaps, 
offers as easy an escape from the problem as that offered by the Impossibility Thesis, which 
simply nips it in the bud. However, they have the advantage of being compatible with the 
Simple View of cases like Logic 101, as well as of avoiding taking premature stances on what 
our evidence can support.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The Simple View says that cases of apparently misleading evidence about what rationality 
requires are just ordinary cases of one’s evidence supporting a false belief. The Impossibility 
Thesis avoids the problem of inconsistent requirements, but comes with its own problems. I 
                                                          
41 See (Hughes, forthcoming; Christensen, 2010; Alexander, 2013). 
42 See Alston (1985); Feldman (1988a); Gibbard (2005); Gibbons (2013); Goldman (1986); Kvanvig (1984); Pollock 
(1979); Schroeder (2009); Unger (1986)). 
43 Alternatively, we might follow Worsnip (2018) in thinking that think that the relevant disambiguation is 
between evidential and coherence-based senses of `rationality requires’. See also Williamson (2017), who 
argues that epistemic rationality is ambiguous between a `content-orientated’ sense, according to which it is 
rational to believe p if and only if one’s evidence supports p; and a `disposition-orientated’ sense, according to 
which it is rational to believe p if and only if `in the same circumstances with the same evidence someone 
disposed to conform their beliefs to what their evidence supports would believe p. In other work, Williamson 
identifies this sense with epistemic blamelessness (forthcoming).  
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argued here that we should reject the Impossibility Thesis. I argued that the routes for 
defending it face serious difficulties, and neither can offer as satisfactory an explanation of 
cases like Logic 101 as the Simple View that they rule out. This means that the problem of 
inconsistent requirements remains, but there are reasons to think it is manageable. 
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